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**1966/02/17**

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Date 11-27-90

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HRP 89-2

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI China Coordinator

SUBJECT : Intelligence on Communist China

REFERENCE : Memorandum from DCI China Coordinator,  
Same subject, dated 9 January 1966

1. The number of people in the Directorate of Intelligence who devote more than half their time to work on Communist China has not changed significantly since January 1964. This level has been maintained despite general personnel cuts of about 16 percent during the same period. Much more of the time of other intelligence officers is now being devoted to the China problem, however, in order to help meet the growing volume of urgent requirements and ad hoc demands.

2. The following table shows changes in the number of analysts employed full time on China in the last two years. A detailed breakdown by Office is attached as Tab A.

	<u>January 1964</u>	<u>January 1966</u>
EPIC	113	138
Other	<u>143</u>	<u>143</u>
Total DDI	253	281

3. Fortunately the problem has been relieved in part through the provision of 27 additional positions for work on Communist China as a supplement to the FY 1966 budget. We plan, furthermore, to review the present allocation of DDI personnel with the objective of shifting people from less urgent tasks to work on China. We are also developing programs to attract personnel well qualified for work on China so that we can realize maximum benefit from positions that become available. In doing this we must find ways of overcoming the difficulties posed by the scarcity of trained China hands and their reluctance to enter into Government service.

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downgrading and  
declassification

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4. A basic problem is that our knowledge of Communist China -- in the military, economic, and political fields -- is far less than what we know about other denied areas, such as the Soviet Union. We therefore need to supplement our analytical attack on contemporary developments with a much broader research effort to build up our store of basic information in all relevant areas of knowledge pertaining to China.

5. Tab B is a projection of the personnel which will be needed by the Directorate of Intelligence to meet minimum requirements on China through 1970. As you know, the long-term personnel requirements for EPIC are among the matters now under intensive study by the Joint Imagery Interpretation Review Group. I prefer, therefore, not to submit a formal projection of EPIC's personnel requirements on China until I have had an opportunity to review the matter thoroughly and consider the findings of the JIIRG study. We are now developing our budget needs for 1968 and supplemental needs for 1967, and China requirements will be emphasized in both.

R. J. SMITH  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

O/DDI:KWagner:fbr (15 February 1966)

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Full Time DBI Personnel Working on Communist China as of  
1 January 1964 and 1 January 1965

	<u>January 1964</u>	<u>January 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966 Supplemental</u>	<u>Total FY 1966</u>
OCI	11	13	---	13
ORR	28	25 1/	6	31
OBI	5	5	4	9
ONE	3	3	3	6
RES. SEC./DBI	3	3 2/	5	8
CCS/DBI	1	2	---	2
FBIS	43	42 5/	---	42
DCS	5	7	---	7
OCR	46	43 4/	9	52
Subtotal	145	143	27	170
NPIC	119	133	---	133
TOTAL	263	281	27	308

- 1/ The net reduction of three in ORR was caused principally by the need to divert analysts in the Economic Research Area to support of Vietnam, South and Southeast Asia.
- 2/ One individual is excluded here because his "action" duties on China have largely removed him from "research".
- 3/ This small reduction was caused by an overall T/O cut of 15 positions FBIS had to take in mid-1964.
- 4/ Similarly an overall T/O cut forced this reduction on OCR.

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TAB B

BDI Personnel Strength Requirements  
for Communist China Target\*

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
OCI	20	30	40	50
ODR	44	56	61	70
ODI	15	19	20	20
ONE	6	6	6	6
Res.St./DDI	6	7	8	8
COA/BDI	3	4	5	6
FBIS	51	51	51	51
DCR	7	7	7	7
OCR	<u>77</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>90</u>
Total*	223	262	285	308

\*Excluding NPIC

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**PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION FOLLOWS**

17 FEB 66

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R. J. SMITH  
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